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INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Antitrust law has an important but understated role in the debate over the regulation of access to
information contained in databases. Databases may broadly be understood to include a collection of
independent works or data arranged in a systematic or methodical way that may be individually
accessed via both electronic and nonelectronic means; they may cover vastly diverse subject matter,
from telephone directories to television programs. 1 In the decade since the European Union adopted
its Database Directive (the “Directive”) 2 , signatories to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 3 have had strong cause to consider its implications on database
protection. Under TRIPs, member states are obligated to protect compilations of data only if they
constitute “intellectual creations” by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents, rather
than to the unoriginal data itself. 4
This follows the U.S. position as laid down in by the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Services Co. 5 Recognizing the potential access bottlenecks caused by conferring
protection based on the “sweat of the brow” approach, the Court rejected the proposition that
investment and effort alone entitled database owners to control access to factual databases. Instead, it
∗
President’s Graduate Fellow, National University of Singapore and Research Scholar, Intellectual Property Academy of
Singapore. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Roundtable Conference on “The Case for and Against Database
Rights” jointly organized by Fordham University Law School, the IP Academy of Singapore, Queen Mary IP Research Institute,
and the IP Research Institute of Australia (22 November 2004, Singapore). I am grateful to Dr. Robert Ian McEwin, Associate
Professor Ng Loy Wee Loon, and Mr. Sun Haochen for reviewing an earlier draft at short notice. I also deeply appreciate the kind
invitation of Emeritus Professor Gerald Dworkin and Professor Hugh Hansen to contribute to this important debate, as well as
the helpful feedback given during the conference, which has been incorporated into this paper. Any errors, mistakes and omissions
remain mine. The author welcomes constructive comments and thoughts, and may be reached at lawdaryl@gmail.com This article
is dedicated to those teaching Intellectual Property and Technology law at the National University of Singapore.
1 Estelle Derclaye, What is a Database?, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 981 (2002).
2 Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (EC) [hereinafter “Directive”], available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31996L0009 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2006).
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 81 [hereinafter “TRIPs”],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm2_e.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
4 Id., art. 10.2. See also World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, art. 5, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65
[hereinafter “WIPO Copyright Treaty”], available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/diplconf/distrib/94dc.htm (last visited
October 16, 2006).
5 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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ruled that databases may be protected through copyright, which required the owner to expand
sufficient skill and judgment in the selection and arrangement of the contents. 6 The Court reasoned
that because facts were not subjectively created, but objectively discovered, copyright protection
could not subsist in mere facts, no matter how great an investment had been made in their
compilation. Since reutilization of data is allowed, the alternative forms of expression to other
authors are limitless. Thus in Feist, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to balance user rights by
conferring a limited right to the creative expression original to the author of a work through the
copyright regime. Singapore has gone one step further by expressly limiting protection in factual
compilations to “the selection or arrangement of its contents which constitutes an intellectual
creation.” 7
However, TRIPs merely sets the minimum standard required for protection; member states are
free to provide for stronger intellectual property rights (IPRs). 8 The European Union has moved
toward extending protection toward the unoriginal data in databases through broadening its criteria
to include those that are protected based on the sufficiency of the investment of labor and resources
expended in their creation: the sui generis database right. 9 Under this right, a database owner can
prevent extraction and reutilization of the whole or a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or
quantitatively, of the content of that database. 10 In certain cases they may also prevent the systematic
extraction and/or reutilization of insubstantial parts. 11 Commentators have noted that this, in effect,
extends protection over the realm of factual information traditionally denied protection by copyright
law. 12
This extension raises a danger that database owners may impede the use of information in
derivative markets or by rivals in the same market to produce competing products, since they may be
conferred a de facto monopoly on the information. In this regard, the Directive attempts to ensure a
degree of balance by:
• Allowing insubstantial extractions from, and reuse of, the contents of databases
made available to the public; 13
• Deeming public lending not an act of extraction or reutilization; 14
• Permitting member states to enact "fair use" exceptions; 15
• Extinguishing the database maker's right to control resale after the first sale; 16
• Subjecting database rights to the laws on restrictive practices and unfair competition
of the Member States; 17 and

6 Id. at 345 (“The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the
author. Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”).
7 Copyright Act §7A(2) (2006) (Sing.) [hereinafter “Singapore Copyright Act”], available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (view
“Legislation Beginning with ‘C’” and click on “Copyright Act”) (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). For a prophetic foreshadowing of this
development in Singapore see Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Copyright Protection for Traditional Compilations of Facts and Computerised Databases—Is
Sweat Copyrightable?, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 96 (1995).
8 Directive, supra note 2, article 1(1).
9 Id., art. 7(1) (“Member states shall provide for a right for the maker of a database which shows that there has been
qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to
prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the
contents of that database”).
10 Id.
11 Id. art. 3.
12 Hasan A. Deveci, Databases: Is Sui Generis A Stronger Bet than Copyright?, 12 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 178 (2004).
13 Directive, supra, note 2, art. 8.
14 Id., art. 7(2)(b).
15 Id., art. 9.
16 Id., arts. 5(c), 7(2)(b).
17 Id. art. 13.
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Mandating a triennial review of the sui generis regime to determine whether
anticompetitive effects require the establishment of a compulsory licensing
scheme. 18
Despite pockets of strong resistance within Europe over the extension of IPRs over factual
compilations, the Directive was passed and duly implemented by member states. 19 Yet, the effect of
this radical extension of IP protection has permeated throughout Europe and beyond. An increasing
number of non-E.U. states seeking to exploit and protect their goods in the Common Market have
concluded bilateral agreements based on reciprocity in protection, 20 causing an expansion of database
rights through a “ripple” effect across the global economy. 21
There is growing consensus that database legislation threatens the “access-incentive” balance in a
way that is inimical to workings of the intellectual property (IP) regime. 22 This imbalance is
exacerbated by the fact that many databases are sole-source databases that cannot be easily replicated
by existing or potential competitors. As more data gets concentrated in the hands of a few rights
owners, users would face increasing difficulty in accessing this information. To this effect, an
overwhelming amount of serious academic debate has focused on the desirability of database
rights. 23
It is not the goal of this Paper to address the issue of whether database rights are desirable.
Rather, it starts from the premise that a trend toward “TRIPs-plus” rights in databases, whatever its
form, is inevitable. The reason is a simple, but compelling one: business needs shape the law. Moves
in favor of expanding the scope of property rights are largely derived from a perceived need to
efficiently trade with relevant information assets. 24 Vast and sweeping developments in the fields of
computers, telecommunications, and information technologies have stimulated the formation of a
new global market of electronic information services and products, in which databases are principal
components. They are valuable sources of information and essential for research in nearly all fields of
study, forming a lucrative market for multinational companies of considerable influence. However,
databases frequently require substantial investment in the form of creative effort, time, labor and
money. Their creators are naturally concerned about their ability to prevent others from illegitimately
exploiting their works. In turn, this protection depends on the scope of monopoly that database
creators enjoy as a species of IP. No serious commentator can deny that this creates tremendous
pressure on national legislatures to extend stronger protection towards database rights. 25
Id. art. 16(3).
NAUTA DUTILH, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND APPLICATION OF DIRECTIVE 96/9/EC ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF
DATABASES 5 (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/ copyright/docs/databases/etd2001b53001e72_en.pdf (report commissioned by the
European Commission to gauge the progress of Member States in implementing the Directive) (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
20 Directive, supra note 2, recital 56. (“[T]he right to prevent unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization in respect of a
database should apply to databases whose makers are nationals or habitual residents of third countries . . . only if such third
countries offer comparable protection to databases produced by nationals of a Member State . . . .”).
21 See BART BEUVING, FRODO FERRO, MICHEL VAN WISSEN, & ALEXANDER ODLE, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, DATABASE PROTECTION AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 9,
available at www.aippi.nl/publicaties2/Q182definitief.pdf (noting the need for reciprocity with non-E.U. entities such as America.)
Some commentators have argued that the European Union would be vulnerable to a challenge that the reciprocity provision of its
Database Directive violates the national treatment norm of the TRIPs Agreement. See Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPS on the
Information Superhighway: International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technology, 41 VILL L. REV. 207, 258-62 (1996).
22 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989)
(“Copyright protection . . . trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing incentives to create the
work in the first place. Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.”). See also
J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Abuse of
Database Right: Sole-Source Information Banks under the E.U. Database Directive, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT: E.U. AND
U.S.
PERSPECTIVES
203-219
(François
Lévêque
and
Howard
Shelanski
eds.
2005),
available
at
http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/abuseofdatabaseright.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006); J.H. Reichman,
Commodification of Scientific Data and the Assault on the Worldwide Public Interest in Research and Development (January 28,
1996) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
23 For a useful summary of the debate in Europe and the United States to date, see Deveci, supra note 12.
24 Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1295-97 (2000).
25 The attitude of national legislatures toward IPRs are perhaps best summed up in the famous words of Judge Peterson:
“[T]here remains the rough practical test that what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting.” Univ. of London Press Ltd v.
18
19
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The principal goal of this Paper is to argue that antitrust law provides a useful tool for
maintaining the “access-incentive” balance, whatever the model of database protection selected. It
does this in three stages. Part I briefly examines the rationale for stronger rights in databases and the
impact this has on the “access-incentive” balance. Part II examines how various jurisdictions have
attempted to address this issue under copyright, the Database Directive, and misappropriation
theory. It concludes that none of the models satisfactorily ensures proper access rights to later
innovators and users. 26 Part III proposes that antitrust law not only addresses access problems
directly, it better reflects commercial expectations by ensuring that owners get the reward due to
them through the conferment of a right that reflects the scope of the exclusive rights granted under
IP law. At the same time, antitrust law ensures that later innovators and consumers are able to access
information contained in databases to the extent allowed by IP law. By factoring in considerations
such as monopoly power and market position, antitrust law is better positioned to determine the
level of intervention needed to ensure proper access based on the effect the denial of access has on
the market. Further, by regulating the exercise of database rights rather than its grant, antitrust law
avoids being snared by the sharply polarized debate blockading business efficacy. It gives database
owners the strong protection they need against free riders while ensuring that consumer access and
commercially viable alternatives and derivatives may be offered beyond the legitimate scope of their
exclusive rights. Because finding the right balance is a difficult judgment to make, it is crucial that
regulators understand that however useful antitrust law may be, the regulation of database rights, like
other IPRs, is a matter requiring the highest caution: too heavy a regulation may lead to the stifling of
innovation and the cessation of otherwise socially beneficial enterprises.
I. THE CASE FOR DATABASE RIGHTS

¶9

¶10

The case for database rights has been well developed. Society gains little by making information
freely available to all, for by so doing, it reduces the quantity and quality of information produced. By
reducing the monetary value attached to a socially productive behaviour like basic research, the
economic incentives to engage in such activities are diminished. Risk-averse investors are reluctant to
invest where free-riding competitors could too easily duplicate publicly available databases without
making any corresponding investments of their own. 27 By offering the same contents at prices lower
than those of the original compilers, whose costs are inevitably higher, the “parasitical” second
comers could drive the former out of business and thus depress the market for innovative future
compilations.
When data is digitized, it becomes more valuable to society. However, it is also susceptible to
market failure. Recent technological developments have eroded the natural lead time that database
developers have enjoyed, since anyone who obtains a copy of the compilation can quickly reproduce
its contents. 28 This results in a suboptimal level of investment in research and development that the
law has attempted to address through stronger database protection. To the extent that the law
protecting investment in databases increases their production, it serves to enhance society's problemsolving abilities through a comprehensive compilation of information. It also increases productivity,
advances education and training, and facilitates the creation of a better informed citizenry through
the ease of informational access. 29 This means that there is a good case for some form of database
Univ. Tutorial Press Ltd., (1916) 2 Ch. 601, 610 (Eng).
26 WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELLYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS & ALLIED
RIGHTS 788 (2003) (“As regards databases there is no compelling economic evidence which demands any one solution to the
balance of incentive-based protection against freedom of access in information.”).
27 Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 22, at 69.
28 Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 82 OR. L. REV. 695, 770 n.329 (2003). See also Wesley L.
Austin, A Thoughtful and Practical Analysis of Database Protection under Copyright Law, and a Critique of Sui Generis Protection, 3 J. TECH. L.
& POL'Y 3, 63-64 (discussing “free-rider” problem of near-effortless copying of an electronic database by a second comer, in light
of facts of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)).
29 G.M. Hunsucker, The European Database Directive: Regional Stepping Stone to an International Model?, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 697, 776 (1997).
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rights in this digital age. Indeed, even most conservative scholars support the essence of rights in the
noncreative aspects of factual databases, differing only on the question of the scope of rights that
should be conferred. 30
At the same time, it should be remembered that:
Industrial and commercial developments in competitive economies have always turned in
large measure upon the borrowing of ideas. [Exclusive] rights should therefore be restricted
to cases where the borrowing is unacceptably parasitic. It should not be allowed to become a
blocking mechanism lurking in every crevice of endeavour. [Database] rights protect large
compilations of data and indeed large collections of copyright works, such as digitised
versions of the contents of a library. In this there is a serious danger that a major source of
information may fall into a monopolist’s hands. The monopoly element may arise because
there is a single producer of the information, (as with . . . the production of official
statistics), or because there is a single holder of sources. 31
II. INTERNAL REGULATION
A. Copyright

¶12

As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Feist decided to reign in the expansion of IPRs by
refusing protection to the “sweat of the brow” under copyright. Recently, Australia diverged sharply
from Feist. In Telstra Corporation Ltd. V. Desktop Marketing Systems Pty. Ltd., 32 the Federal Court of
Australia had to consider whether there was copyright in the white page and yellow page directories
and the headings books. The court stressed the importance of protecting the effort invested into the
production of works, opining that it would be wrong to ignore the effort of collecting those facts
which are the reason for the work's very existence. As Judge Finkelstein put it:
There are policy reasons both for and against the result in Feist . . . . On the one hand, the
ability to prevent others from appropriating information in a compilation of facts will
severely limit the ability of later authors to build upon earlier works. This may impair
progress in both the sciences and the arts . . . . On the other hand, there are those who argue
that the abandonment of the “sweat of the brow” theory has threatened the progress of
information. The argument is that the collection of factual materials is essential to the
economy. Databases provide a wealth of information to business people, professionals,
scientists and consumers. If copyright protection is not given, the investment of the time
and money that is required to produce these compilations will not be forthcoming. 33

¶13

Therefore, Australian copyright law seems to embrace a two-category approach to database
protection similar in substance, though not form, to the European model. While there is an attraction
in extending copyright to cover investments in databases in the same manner as it was extended to
cover the once unfamiliar domain of software, 34 reliance on copyright is unsatisfactory for several
reasons.
The first problem is the length of protection in copyright. The duration of protection under U.S.,
Singapore, and Australian copyright law is the life of the author plus 70 years. 35 This results in legal
30 L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U.
DAYTON. L. REV. 385, 409 (1992) (asserting that factual collections should be afforded protection for a limited time, against
competitors only, not encompassing the contents of the work, and “subject to forfeiture for predatory pricing”); Malla Pollack, The
Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 123-24 (1999) (advocating statutory protection that would protect only databases at risk of market
failure); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 22, at 137-51 (suggesting unfair competition and modified liability approaches to
database protection).
31 CORNISH & LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 789.
32 Telstra Corp. v. Desktop Marketing Sys. Pty. Ltd. (2001) 51 I.P.R. 257 (interpreting the Australian Copyright Act of 1968).
33 Id. at 279-80.
34 See, e.g., Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d Cir. 1983) (landmark ruling that
computer program, in both source code and object code forms, was “literary work” protected by copyright).
35 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000); Singapore Copyright Act, supra note 7, § 28(2); Australian Copyright Act 1968 § 33, available at
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protection for databases that is long and “thick,” because it is not limited to mere expression and
includes facts as well. Important information may well be tied up in proprietary rights for too long,
since copyright makes no distinction between time-sensitive databases, and those that are exhaustive
and have changed little over time. 36 Copyright fails to meaningfully address the economics of
databases, particularly the interest in promoting an optimal degree of maintenance, since the entire
duration of protection is granted upfront. Databases rely primarily on their comprehensiveness and
accuracy to make them attractive in the market. 37 Consumers would be less willing to use a database
without some degree of confidence that the contents are accurate. The degree to which databases are
updated and their contents verified as accurate is thus vital. 38 Therefore copyright gives strong rights
at the point of grant without ensuring that the quid pro quo of comprehensive and accurate updates
are provided by database owners in return for their protection.
Secondly, the tests employed in determining subsistence of copyright are notoriously difficult to
apply. Copyright protects expressions, not their underlying ideas. 39 Just how far back one can push in
separating the expression from the ideas underlying a work is not easy to answer. 40 In this regard,
there is a risk of protection extending to the contents of such compilations that are given copyright
protection. As one commentator noted:
The use of copyright to fill in gaps left by an absence of unfair competition law can of
course be dangerous. Copyright operates on a property basis, confers lengthy protection and,
aside from the limited defences such as fair dealing or fair use type defences that might be
available, generally cares not whether the defendant's use is fair or unfair. Any intellectual
property protection for factual databases inevitably cuts close to the bone. Free access to
scientific and research data, especially where the data has been gathered by public bodies,
can be seen as a vital cog of the freedom of information principle that is essential to
scientific, industrial research and educational interests. 41

¶15

A copyright-based solution for database protection would be overly protective, compromise
accessibility of fundamental information, and impede technological progress. And certainly,
accessibility to scientific and technological research information contained in databases is not
guaranteed under “fair use” provisions of copyright law. Yet at the same time, applying the copyright
regime to databases can lead to underprotection of certain databases and overprotection of others.
The result is that the scope of legal protection is unclear, increasing the costs of determining and
enforcing rights. These costs would be passed on to users, with the likely result that informal
protection through contracts or the use of technology will be employed by rational business people
seeking to safeguard their investments. A final, fundamental objection is that Article 10.2 of TRIPs
explicitly denies protection to noncreative aspects of factual compilations. 42 Therefore, even to
extend copyright to cover databases in their entirety would be nothing less than revolutionary.

http://www.comlaw.gov.au (click on “Commonly viewed legislation” in left sidebar, then click on “Copyright Act 1968,” select the
“current” version, and choose Word or PDF format from icons in lower left corner) (last visited October 25, 2006).
36 It has been suggested that a better alternative lies in giving substantially stronger protection for a shorter period of time. See
Susanna Leong, Legal Protection of Factual Compilations and Databases, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 1047, 1057 (2002).
37 Christian Koboldt, The E.U. Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update: An Economic Analysis, 17
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 127-28 (1997) (noting that a database designed to provide easy access to “all available information” on
a given subject may lose its entire practical value if it is not updated “continuously”).
38 Id.
39 WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2 (“Copyright protection extends to expression and not ideas, procedures,
methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”).
40 See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) (observing of the expression/idea
dichotomy that “[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can”); LB (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Prod. Ltd.,
(1979) R.P.C. 551, 629. In the latter case, Lord Hailsham, after remarking that there is no copyright in ideas, observed that “it all
depends on what you mean by ‘ideas.’”
41 See George Wei, Telephone Directories and Databases: The Policy at the Helm of Copyright Law and a Tale of Two Cities,
3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 316, 330 (2004).
42 TRIPs, supra note 3, art. 10.2. This creates some confusion, since Article 1.1 allows member states to adopt more extensive
protection than the minimum established by TRIPS. See id. art. 1.1.
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B. An Alternative in Unfair Competition?
¶16

¶17

¶18

¶19

Judging by the strength of the apparent convictions driving the various versions of the
Collections of Information Antipiracy Bills 43 and the latest Database and Collections of Information
Misappropriation Act 44 in the United States, it might be easy to think that a solution may be found in
opting for the unfair competition model where access is regulated through unfair competition under
the doctrine of misappropriation. This doctrine was laid down in International News Service v. Associated
Press 45 , and subsequently developed in National Basketball Association v. Motorola Inc. 46 Essentially, it
states that where a plaintiff incurs cost in acquiring time-sensitive information, the plaintiff may
prevent a direct competitor from accessing this information where such access would reduce the
incentive to produce the information or the overall quality of the plaintiff’s product or service. 47
The immediate attraction with this model is that no data is tied up in property rights, avoiding
many of the problems in the European and Australian approaches. However, the problem with
unfair competition is that it is unclear where and how a delineation of acts deemed to be ”unfair”
ought to be drawn. If the owner has no right in the absence of unfair direct competition, the
protection is pitifully narrow. Users who would otherwise have to pay an equitable license fee would
now be able to access the information without allowing the database owner to recoup its investment.
However, if a database maker has the right to exclude both indirect competitors as well as
downstream users, then it is difficult to see how the unfair competition model will ensure freer access
when the potential scope of the exclusion is the same as the Directive’s proprietary model. Further,
as commentators have rightly suggested, mere personal rights in database protection are
commercially emasculating, and are not adequate as economic incentives for undertakings in the
database industry. 48
Moreover, the vagaries of unfair competition detract from the general trend toward
harmonization of IPRs regionally and globally. This difficulty was one reason why the European
Union rejected the unfair competition model in favor of a sui generis database right. 49 Important
differences exist in the procedural requirements and substantive tests even between developed
nations at in their IP laws. However, in order for any meaningful international trade to take place,
these differences must be bridged by common principles. Early development of copyright, patent,
and trademark law in England set the mold that was largely adopted throughout the common law
countries of the world, and later through treaties and conventions formed the basis for international
harmonization of IP law. 50 Historically, IP conventions such as Berne and TRIPs give clear evidence
of such aspirations in the field of IP. More recently, the WIPO has attempted global patent reform to
harmonize substantive requirements of patent law. 51 Business efficacy therefore militates against
adopting this model of unfair competition.
Thus emerges a sobering but critical observation. IP law, while well suited to determine the
scope and duration of exclusionary rights at the point of grant, is at best a blunt instrument in
regulating access and curbing potential anticompetitive effects that block access ex post. It gives too
43 See Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Bill of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996). See also
Collections of Information Antipiracy Bill of 1997, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997); Collections of Information Bill, H.R. 354,
106th Cong. (1999).
44 H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003).
45 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 259 (1918).
46 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997).
47 See id. at 852 (describing scope of “‘hot-news’ INS-like claims” for misappropriation of information).
48 Leong, supra note 38, at 1066.
49 CORNISH & LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 786. (“The sui generis right has its place in the Database Directive because there
is no harmonized law of unfair competition as between the EC States by which undue misappropriation of information could be
attacked.”)
50 DAVID I. BAINDRIDGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 199 (2002) (“[T]here are many similarities and most of the basic
principles are common.”).
51 World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Suggestions for the Further Development of Internal Patent Law, Standing Committee on the Law
of Patents, ¶ 1, SCP/4/2 (Sept. 25 2000) (prepared by the International Bureau).
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much protection to the aberrant owner, and offers too little to efficient newcomers and the public.
IPRs are fixed in length and scope and nonderogable save in the case of an invalid grant or a judicial
finding of noninfringement, and incorporate scant consideration of the economic impact of granting
access or upholding the refusal to grant access. Further, the role of IP law lies in shielding would-be
infringers from liability rather than compelling a positive sharing of access to information. This is
particularly important when independent access is difficult or impossible, such as when information
is coded or protected by anticircumvention measures. The rational mind, recognizing the inadequacy
of endogenous regulation, looks outward for a more satisfactory solution.
C. The Database Directive
¶20

It has been said that the Directive adequately balances the public's need for information access
with the need for production incentives within the European Community. 52 While it may be fairly
said that the Directive has done commendably well in attempting to make a very difficult balance
work, problems with the Directive soon become apparent on closer scrutiny.
1. Non-Substantial Extraction and Re-Utilization

¶21

¶22

¶23

The Directive’s first flaw lies in the stifling of derivative innovation. 53 Under the Directive, any
extraction from a database must be not be “substantial,” and “reutilization” of data is not allowed. 54
This therefore limits the amount of information downstream customers, consumers, or rivals may
extract. Where the owner’s database contains information not easily replicated, this gives it
considerable monopoly power to exclude or exploit those seeking access to that information. The
database owner may charge high access prices or limit output. It may also engage in elimination of
rivals or exclude potential rivals in the primary markets for data or secondary markets where the data
is used derivatively. Conduct like this harms the competitive process, reduces social welfare, and
should not be extended beyond the level of appropriability justified by the database right. 55
An argument may be raised that factual data is open to the public, and therefore not subject to
the tyranny of the database owner. The database owner who overprices its product also risks price
competition from those who create identical databases, since third parties always remain free to
generate their own databases, since the facts are free. 56 The law cannot allow others to simply copy
the information or arrangement from the first compilation or it would be tantamount to sanctioning
them to free ride of the owner’s effort and investment. Those who desire the facts must therefore
find and arrange the same facts for themselves, 57 or seek a license from the incumbent owner. If the
database owner tries to extract an inordinate license fee, it will risk price competition and market
displacement from more efficient second-comers.
In practice however, this justification ignores the economic realities of the database industry.
Commercially successful database industries are often those with few or single sources. Entrants
would therefore have to duplicate the initial effort by collecting data independently. This task is at the
very least an onerous one, or else monopoly profits would have encouraged more entrants in the
long run. Start-up costs are relatively high, the prospects for market-sharing have seldom been
realized, much valuable data is unavailable from public sources, and the existence of one complex
database seems empirically to constitute a barrier to entry that is seldom overcome. Where data is not
52 Neeta Thakur, Database Protection in the European Union and the United States: The European Database Directive as an
Optimum Global Model, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 101, 102 (2001).
53 Hugenholtz, supra note 22.
54 C.D. Freedman, Should Canada Enact A New Sui Generis Database Right? 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
35, 92-94, (2002).
55 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 65, 65-92, 169-201 (1990).
56 Gregory M. Hunsuker, The European Database Directive: Regional Stepping Stone to an International Model?, 7 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 697, 747 (1997).
57 For a detailed discussion, see George Wei, Telephone Directories and Databases: The Policy at the Helm of Copyright Law and a Tale
of Two Cities, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 316, 337 (2004).
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legally available for second comers to exploit, there is no opportunity to avoid the originator's
exclusive rights to prevent extraction or reuse of existing data. Moreover, even if the entrant has the
potential to successfully reproduce the database, the reduced expected profits from a duopoly or
oligopoly might not justify entering with the burden of such a potentially high fixed cost in the first
place. Users and potential competitors of a sole-source database owner can find it nearly impossible
to avoid infringing the owner’s database right. This can result in a near-absolute monopoly in the
primary database market as well as a corresponding downstream monopoly in derivative information
products or services. The potential for such distortions in the competitive process to harm consumer
welfare is considerable.
This powerful right to prevent extraction conferred on database makers is subjected to only a
small and pitifully weak set of public-interest limitations. Again in theory, any lawful user of the
database may extract or reutilize insubstantial parts of its contents. 58 However, commentators are
worried that large amounts of information could be locked away from society and may only be
accessible through payment of prohibitive fees. 59 Beyond the privilege of using insubstantial parts of
a database for any purpose, lawful users may also extract the contents of nonelectronic databases for
their private purposes. However, they may not extract the contents of electronic databases even for
purely private purposes. 60 Accordingly, even paying users would need a separate or additional license
authorizing ”the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents“ to
another medium. 61 The Directive stipulates that Member States may allow these same users to
extract data from either electronic or nonelectronic databases for the limited purpose of “illustration
for teaching or scientific research,” provided that their purpose is noncommercial and that they
credit the source. 62 Yet, any extraction or reutilization of a substantial part of an electronic database
for educational or scientific purposes other than “illustration” will almost certainly run foul of the
general provision prohibiting “acts which conflict with a normal exploitation of [the] database or
which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker of the database.” 63
2. Indefinite Duration of Protection

¶25

¶26

The second flaw with the Directive stems from the indefinite duration of protection it gives
database owners. The term of protection of the database right is fifteen years from the date of
completion or from the date it was first made available to the public, 64 and renewable if there are
sufficient alterations to the database for another term. 65 The provision for a new fifteen-year term of
protection based on any substantial qualitative or quantitative change to the contents of the database
creates the potential for a database right to last forever. 66
This “rolling” database right creates three problems. First, although it is far from clear what
constitutes sufficient further investment to justify extension of the term, it seems to be an easy
threshold to cross. The Directive suggests that even “verification of the contents of the database” 67
would be enough to trigger a new term of protection. 68 Thus, most electronic databases will be
updated often enough to attract semi-permanent protection. This runs counter to the core idea of IP
protection, where a limited license of monopoly power is conferred by the State in return for

Directive, supra note 2, at art. 8.
Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 147 (2004).
60 Directive, supra note 2, art. 3.
61 Id. art. 7.
62 Id. art. 6.
63 Id. art. 7.
64 Id. art. 10.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. recital 55.
58
59

Copyright © 2006 Stanford Technology Law Review. All Rights Reserved.

¶27

contribution to the existing pool of knowledge in society. 69 Second, while a relatively large number of
database cases have been decided in various jurisdictions, most assume that subject matter which
constitutes a database is self-evident. This suggests that it may be relatively easy for a diverse variety
of subject matter to qualify as a database. 70 The corollary to easy qualification is a potential for
pervasive interference by database owners over the market for information contained in their
databases. Cases have shown how easy it is to infringe the database right. In British Horseracing Bd. Ltd.
v. William Hill Org. Ltd., the court held that indirect extraction and re-utilization of a dynamic database
amounted to infringement. 71 With its broad definition of databases and low threshold for protection,
the Directive may in effect grant a perpetual monopoly over increasing swaths of public domain
information. Third, the Directive does not indicate whether extensions to term relate only to the
added material, or to the database as a whole. 72 If protection is accorded only to newly added
material, it creates an administratively onerous task for the court. Quite apart from the difficulties of
tracing the infringing material to the database, the court must also ascertain whether each alleged
breach concerns the new material or the old. Commentators have noted that the Directive casts a net
that is too broad, too unchecked by institutional balancing mechanisms, and too uncertain in many of
its provisions. Indeed, some have taken the extreme view that the situation is dire enough that the
Directive should be repealed in its entirety as soon as possible. 73
An earlier version of the Directive contained a provision on compulsory licensing that would
have come into force if the information could not be obtained freely from other sources. This
reflected the concerns of a monopolization of information expressed during the Directive's
drafting. 74 These provisions were deleted from the final Directive. All that is left of the compulsory
licensing scheme originally envisaged is Recital 47, which cautions that:
[I]n the interests of competition between suppliers of information products and services,
protection by the sui generis right must not be afforded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of
a dominant position, in particular as regards the creation and distribution of new products
and services which have an intellectual, documentary, technical, economic or commercial
added value. 75

¶28

¶29

However, even allowing for the compulsory licensing provision, the ills of database rights are not
satisfactorily addressed. Compulsory licensing is a blunt instrument that forces access without
carefully calibrating the extent of access needed and the amount of compensation sufficient to
protect the right holder’s interests and investments. Further, it puts courts in a position of constant
supervision and interferes deeply with business decisions, including ex ante incentives to invest in
databases.
Instead of a compulsory licensing provision, E.U. legislators decided to ensure proper access to
databases through two provisions. First, Article 13 expressly subjects all rights granted under the
Directive to the laws on restrictive practices and unfair competition of the Member States. 76 Second,
Article 16 of the Directive provides for a monitoring rule obliging the Commission to examine the
application of the sui generis right, and “whether the application of this right has led to abuse of a
dominant position or to other interference with free competition which would justify appropriate

Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005).
See, e.g., Case C-338/02, Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. Svenska Spel AB, 2004 E.C.R. I-10497 (suggesting that databases should
be construed widely).
71 Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2004 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 598 (Nov. 9, 2004).
72 CORNISH & LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 789.
73 Stephen M. Maurer et al., Europe’s Database Experiment, 294 SCI. 789, 790 (2001).
74 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases, art. 8, COM (92) 24 final (May 13, 1992), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=20478 (last visited Nov. 6, 2006). See also Guido Westkamp,
Balancing Database Sui Generis Right Protection with European Monopoly Control Under Article 82 (2001) E.C., 22 EUR. COMPETITION L.
REV. 13, 14.
75 Directive, supra note 2, recital 47.
76 Id. art. 13.
69
70
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measures being taken, including the establishment of non-voluntary licensing arrangements.” 77 It is
to a study of the interaction between antitrust law and database rights that we now turn.
III. ANTITRUST LAW
¶30

Many legal systems today monitor the exercise of IPRs within the framework of antitrust law,
even though they are already internally regulated through IP legislation. 78 Cases involving the abuse
of database rights as such have not been considered within the context of antitrust laws of Australia,
the United States and Singapore as of yet. However, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has had the
opportunity to consider databases protected by copyright, and provides a useful canvas for
discussion. Although there are some differences in the antitrust laws of the United States, Australia,
Singapore, and the European Union, the underlying principles are sufficiently similar for meaningful
comparative study and cross-application.
A. Theoretical Foundations at the Interface of Database Rights and Antitrust law

¶31

¶32

There is a degree of consensus on the idea that IP and antitrust laws have distinct and
complementary roles. 79 IP laws function ex ante to determine the threshold for granting IPRs as well
as the scope and duration that the IPRs may be exploited. Through statutory and common law
defenses, IP law also attempts to protect the public’s noncommercial interests. For example, fair dealing
allows insubstantial use of copyrighted material for the purposes of private research, current affairs
reporting and criticism. 80 Similarly, disclosure and compulsory licensing provisions for nonworking
of patents ensure that the public benefits from the grant of a limited economic patents monopoly. 81
In contrast, antitrust law functions ex post to regulate the exercise of IPRs following the grant. It
protects the public’s commercial interests by ensuring that IPR owners do exercise their rights to the
extent granted for the specific subject matter so that market competition is not distorted and
consumer welfare is not harmed. 82
In the context of databases, a database owner may, by virtue of its dominant market position,
have the power to unilaterally block rivals’ access to information and compete using exclusionary
rights conferred by database legislation. For example, were the owner of telephone listings in Feist
conferred rights over those listings, it could foreclose derivative markets for creating an online
database containing the medical history based on extraction of data in those telephone listings. If
such conduct were found to be anticompetitive, the court would likely grant a compulsory license
requiring the owner to grant access to makers of the medical database. In this regard, cases involving
such unilateral refusals to deal cut to the heart of the database owner’s right to prevent others from
using his or her IP: an obligation to license conflicts directly with the rights granted to an IP owner
by IP laws. Thus, as a general rule there is no obligation under antitrust law either to use or license
protected works. 83 Despite this, commentators have acknowledged that antitrust law has an
important complementary role to play beside endogenous regulatory mechanisms that IP law might
provide in regulating access to database content. 84
Id. art. 16.
See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 6 (1989).
79 While IP and competition laws have similar goals, there is often tension in the means that they go about achieving these
goals. See MARK LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 545 (2000).
80 CORNISH & LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 434-36.
81 Id. at 291-94.
82 Of course, it may be argued that defenses and exceptions in IP law also protect dynamic competition by fostering
innovation and therefore promote the public’s commercial interests. But the assertion here is simply that competition law plays a
complementary role to IP law in ensuring the access-incentive balance through its greater focus on the commercial aspects of
market conduct.
83 Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, 4 C.M.L.R. 122.
84 CORNISH & LLEWELLYN, supra note 26, at 789. (“Beyond this [endogenous regulatory mechanism] lie the corrective
measures which may be taken against abuse of dominant position under Art. 8[2] of the Rome Treaty. The Magill case authorises
77
78
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It is useful to begin the discussion by considering the archetypal scenarios involving abuse of
database rights with regard to access:
Scenario 1: The complainant (X) argues that A’s refusal to grant access to A’s database prevents X
from entering the market, and that this reduces consumer choice, protects A’s downstream activities
deriving from the database right from competition and thus keeps prices for the downstream product
too high. It further argues that the cost of X establishing its own database as an alternative to A’s
database would be prohibitive and would cancel out the potential advantages it is able to offer
consumers. A argues that there are intrinsic advantages in keeping both the upstream and
downstream activities in house because of economies of scale. The so-called benefits X claims to be
able to deliver to customers if only it could gain access to A’s upstream database belong to A as a
reward for having built up the database in the first place. Competition and consumer interests are
adequately protected by the fact that A faces actual or potential competition from firms who supply
alternative “bundles” of upstream and downstream products to consumers. 85
Scenario 2: X argues as above. However, X seeks to produce a rival database for the same market as
A. A argues that refusing access to rivals in horizontal markets constitutes a legitimate exercise of the
specific subject matter of its database rights. 86

¶34

Within each scenario, plaintiffs seeking access have canvassed two arguments, one based on
leveraging, and the other based on the essential facilities doctrine (EFD). These arguments are as
follows:
Argument 1 (Leveraging): A, by refusing access to the database is leveraging its monopoly power
into a downstream market for derivative products. 87 This argument also refers to leveraging power
from one product to another, as in tying cases. A maintains its monopoly power while preventing
rivals from offering new products in downstream markets which depend on the incumbent’s
proprietary information. Alternatively, A may have competed successfully to gain dominance, but has
since stagnated in its efforts to innovate and is using its monopoly power to prevent more efficient
competition from appearing. In either case, leverage tactics have three characteristics in common.
First, the effort to maximize monopoly returns makes them exploitative in nature. Second, they
restrict the competitive process by preventing rivals and customers from gaining access, and are
therefore exclusionary. Third, the restrictive impact of the conduct is felt at a point removed from
the source of power. Such conduct may be prohibited under antitrust laws where there is lack of a
legitimate justification.
Argument 2 (Essential Facilities Doctrine): The second, more potent, argument is that the
database constitutes an essential facility. A therefore owns a facility that cannot plausibly be
duplicated, and participates in a competitive downstream market that requires access to the facility.
By denying access to the facility, A either eliminates downstream competition or imposes significant
costs on competitors. 88 This sort of monopolization does not require any anticompetitive “conduct”
in the affirmative sense. The EFD eschews the investment rationale for protecting monopoly power
the imposition of compulsory licenses where, exceptionally, it is found that intellectual property is being licensed only on
unacceptable terms. This power could prove to be of some significance in relation to database right, where the owner refuses any
license at all or offers terms so extravagant as to have the same effect.”)
85 KRISTY MIDDLETON, BARRY RODGER & ANGUS MACCULLOCH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON UK AND EC
COMPETITION LAW 353 (2003).
86 See, e.g., Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039.
87 See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Commercial Solvents v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 223.
88 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); B&I Line, P.L.C. v. Sealink Harbours,
Ltd., 5 C.M.L.R. 255 (1992); Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8.
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in databases and imposes a positive obligation to share IP with rivals. The typical paradigm for
market essential facilities is a “bottleneck” through which rivals must be allowed to pass lest
competition be foreclosed. 89
B. Regulating Abuse of Database Rights: Lessons from Europe
¶35

¶36

Antitrust law articulates the concerns inherent in the Directive and provides an additional check
by imposing special responsibilities on database owners who are granted a dominant position and are
able to damage effective competition in markets by preventing access to markets or driving out
existing competition. Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome (EC Treaty) 90 prohibits abuse of a dominant
position through unilateral anticompetitive behavior, and may be invoked in cases of unilateral
refusals to license IP, alleged tying arrangements, and anticompetitive IP enforcement actions, where
this affects trade between Member States. 91
The leading cases in Europe are Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd. v.
Commission of the European Communities 92 (Magill) and IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health
GmbH & Co. KG 93 (IMS Health). It is worth noting from the onset that while both cases were
brought on the premise of copyright, in reality they dealt with access issues more properly framed
within database rights. 94 Magill and IMS Health are important and interesting cases to consider for
several reasons. Magill is a Scenario 1 case involving two vertically related parties, where the
downstream firm seeks data unique to the upstream incumbent. In contrast, IMS Health is a Scenario
2 case, involving a rival seeking horizontal entry to serve the incumbent’s customer base. In both
cases, claims of leveraging and essential facilities were considered, either implicitly or explicitly, with
opposite conclusions reached in each case. 95
89 For a useful summary of the EFD, see Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property
Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 409 (2001).
90 Art. 230.
91 Article 82 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
For the purpose of comparison locally, Article 82 may be compared to Section 46 of the Singapore Competition Act 2004
(Cap 46) which provides:
(1) Subject to section 48, any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings which amounts to the abuse of a
dominant position in any market in Singapore is prohibited.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), conduct may, in particular, constitute such an abuse if it consists in —
(a) predatory behaviour towards competitors;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage; or
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the contracts.
(3) In this section, “dominant position” means a dominant position within Singapore or elsewhere.
92 Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann & Indep. Television Publ’ns Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743.
93 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039.
94 The Directive had not yet been implemented at the time of hearing for both cases. See Donna M. Gitter, The Conflict in the
European Community Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: A Call for Legislative Clarification of the Essential Facilities
Doctrine, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 217 (2003).
95 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, ¶ 35 (opinion of Advocate General
Jacobs) (“The Court has not as yet referred in its case-law to the essential facilities doctrine. Nevertheless it has ruled in a number
of cases concerning refusal to supply goods or services.”). See also Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property And
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1. Magill
¶37

¶38

Magill TV Guides sought to publish a weekly guide to all television programming on the
channels then broadcasting in Ireland. At that time, there were three companies broadcasting in the
Irish market, and each published its own weekly guide. The broadcasting companies claimed
copyright in their respective weekly guides, and sued Magill for copyright infringement. However,
Magill asserted that the broadcasting companies had violated Article 82 by refusing to grant it a
license under their copyright. The Commission found a violation under Article 82(b), because the
refusal to license prevented the introduction of a new product for which there was consumer
demand. The court agreed, holding that in special circumstances, the three television stations were
required to license the copyright in their listings to Magill. It referred to the special circumstances of
the case, but did not specify precisely the facts that were exceptional. It stated that:
• The television stations were the only sources of the basic information, 96 their refusal
to supply this information prevented the appearance of a new product that the
stations did not offer and for which there was potential consumer demand; 97
• There was no justification for the refusal 98 ; and
• The stations reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly TV guides, by
excluding all competition on that market. 99
Magill therefore established that a refusal to license IPRs could, in certain circumstances, violate
Article 82, as well as empowered the Commission to impose compulsory licensing as a remedy for a
violation of Article 82. The ECJ decided that the policy of maintaining effective competition in
secondary markets can in exceptional circumstances trump the policy of encouraging innovation and
investment in technological progress. Magill recognized that in a two-market situation, antitrust law
needs to intervene to protect against leveraging that forecloses the downstream competition to other
competitiors. However, Magill arguably presents a more extreme version of a Scenario 1 type
situation. Not only did the defendant use its copyright to block entry by a downstream entrant, it did
not and could not provide the consolidated TV guides that customers wanted. At the same time, it
clearly held an essential resource required to produce that guide.
2. IMS Health

¶39

In IMS Health, the court had the opportunity to refine the “special circumstances” test. IMS, the
largest supplier in the world of information on sales and prescription of pharmaceutical products,
divided the German territory into 1860 “bricks.” It claimed intellectual property rights in the 1860brick structure pursuant to a provision in German copyright law transposing the Directive. Until
1999, IMS was the only firm providing regional data in Germany. Then two firms, NDC and AzyX,
entered the market and tried to base the information they supplied on different geographic zones,
but discussions with customers showed that this would not be marketable because it would not
correspond to the territorial divisions already in use. The new entrants then started using IMS's brick
system until they were sued successfully for infringement of copyright. Without conceding their
infringement, NDC and AzyX brought a complaint before the Commission contending that,
notwithstanding its intellectual property protection, IMS must grant its competitors a compulsory
license for this database. Invoking the EFD, IMS's competitors argued that IMS abused its dominant
market position by refusing, without objective justification, to license a facility that is essential for the
supply of services. 100 IMS countered that such an interpretation of the EFD would render IP
Antitrust: The European Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 801 (2002).
96 Radio Telefis Eireann, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 at ¶ 53.
97 Id. at ¶ 54.
98 Id. at ¶ 55.
99 Id.
100 Commission Decision 01/165, Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP
D3/38.044, NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim measures), 2002 O.J. (L 59) 18, ¶¶ 18-19, 25, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/repert/0830.htm (locate entry “32002D0165,” then select “html” or “pdf” format).
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protection granted under national law ineffective, thereby deterring investment and innovation. In
refusing access to IMS’s database, the court laid down four concurrent conditions required to find
that the refusal by a copyright holder in a dominant position is abusive:
• The product protected by copyright must be indispensable to compete in the
secondary market;
• The refusal to license copyright must prevent the emergence of a new product for
which there is a potential consumer demand;
• The refusal must not be justified by objective considerations; and
• It must be likely to eliminate all competition in the secondary market. 101
C. Balancing Incentives and Access
¶40

It is often said that intellectual property law and competition are at odds. One confers a
monopoly and the other seeks to prevent it. Such allegations are not without truth. National
legislatures have recognized the need to ensure creators of intellectual goods appropriate rewards of
their efforts as an incentive to foster future innovation by the owner, and others seeking the prize of
temporary monopoly profits. In addition, intellectual property law contains a finely tuned mechanism
to ensure that future innovation by rivals and later innovators are not impeded by a barrage of
exceptions and limitations in scope and duration of rights. The astute reader would notice that this
sophisticated mechanism may work splendidly ex ante to the grant of the right, but its ability to
referee access ex post is limited. It makes no distinction between the fresh entrant who has yet to
appropriate its due returns and the incumbent feasting off persistent monopoly rewards. Nor in
granting access does it look to who desires it and what effect that might have on the right owner. In
particular, it makes no distinction between downstream rivals and those in the primary market where
the intellectual property itself is situated. It is proposed that antitrust law meets both by taking into
account the monopoly power of the database owner, as well as its position relative to those seeking
access.
1. Requirement of Dominance

¶41

¶42

Antitrust law has built-in safeguards that must be satisfied before it intervenes in the exploitation
of database rights. The threshold requirement is that the owner must be found to occupy a dominant
position in a particular market. The exercise of exclusive rights by database owners, even those
owning sole-source databases, does not indicate dominance. 102 In accordance with the policy
considerations underlying grants of copyright and patent protection, database owners are allowed to
appropriate the revenues stemming from their investment or creation, and refusing access should be
deemed legal when they purport to protect the owner's lawful return. Prohibiting property owners
from “reap[ing] where they have sown” 103 negates their property rights and incurs the kind of cost
that competition policy seeks to avoid. The courts have limited “prohibited conduct” to activity that
departs from normal practices expected from firms in that particular industry. 104 Courts may also
consider whether a dominant firm’s practices limit competition to no greater extent than is necessary
to vindicate legitimate interests.
To justify interference, there must be a further finding that there are so few substitutes for the
protected product or technology that the owner has the power, in a relevant product market, to be
Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039 at ¶¶ 38, 52.
Radio Telefis Eireann, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 at ¶ 46 (“So far as dominant position is concerned, it is to be remembered at the
outset that mere ownership of an intellectual property right cannot confer such a position.”).
103 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13
(2003).
104 Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 3 C.M.L.R. 211 at ¶ 91 (defining “abuse” by referring to
methods “different from those which condition normal competition”). But cf. STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE REGULATION OF INNOVATION 184 (1998) (noting that “normal” competition is
assessed by reference to competition policy concerns, not by reference to customary commercial practice).
101
102
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able to prevent effective competition from being maintained in that market. 105 In general, high
market share is a key initial indicator of dominance, 106 although regulators are likely to look more
broadly to the ability of the allegedly dominant firm to control prices in the face of pressure from
competitors and to erect barriers to entry. Both issues turn on determining what constitutes the
relevant market. Generally, the court treats IP product markets as being narrowly defined in terms of
consumer demand, even though the database owner may have every sound commercial reason to
include supply-side considerations as well. 107 For example, in Volvo, 108 the issue arose whether the
market for spare parts was separate from the market for new cars. It may have made perfect sense
for car firms to view it as one market so that they could keep their car prices low to compete and
take their profits in the after-sales maintenance market. However, the court distinguished between
the individual purchasers of cars who might welcome the “package deal,” and those interested only in
repairs. 109 This suggests that, as long as there is one specific group of consumers that demands a
product that can be met by some other substitute product, it should qualify as a separate market. By
narrowly defining the particular market in this manner, competition policy recognizes the real
potential of database rights impeding competition in the position of dominance held by the database
owner. This places a special responsibility on the owner to act in a way that does not impede
effective competition to the prejudice of consumers. 110 At the same time, competition policy sets out
guidelines demarcating exceptional circumstances when antitrust law would interfere with the
exploitation of database rights.
Antitrust law will also consider the degree of protection the information deserves in granting
access. Like the owners of factual information in Magill, database owners can impede effective
competition and discourage innovation via add-on products. One need only think of the tremendous
impediment to progress that Celera, as one of the main owners of information relating to the
decoded human genome, could cause if it were to act as the defendants in Magill did in preventing
the appearance of revolutionary life-saving pharmaceutical products. While the information in Magill
required little resource and investment to obtain, the opposite is true of the information in IMS
Health. There, the court recognized that to order compulsory licensing simply because IMS's creation
has emerged as the strong preference of the pharmaceutical industry due to its legitimate business
practices would in fact punish IMS for its own success. 111 The court also noted that IMS had
expended much money and effort in developing its database, and might not have done so had it not
expected to exclude its rivals. Seen in this way, the justification for protecting IMS’s rights in its
database is clearly distinguishable from the copyright in television listings at issue in Magill, where
enforcement of compulsory licensing for television listings would not likely impact the production
and release of program listings. Indeed, the broadcasters would have the same incentive to produce
and disseminate programs regardless of whether or not they were protected from competition in the
television guide market.
2. Distinction Between Primary and Derivative Markets

¶44

Antitrust law also makes a distinction between the primary market where the IPR is exercised
and the secondary derivative market that exceeds the scope of interference to market competition
allowed by IP law. Where parties are competitors that exist at a horizontal level as in IMS Health,
antitrust law is more willing to allow market forces to play out the result undisturbed. IMS enjoyed
Case 27/76, United Brands v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, ¶¶ 1, 2.
Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461 ¶ 5.
107 See Case 22/78, Hugin v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 1869.
108 Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, ¶¶ 5-9 (opinion of Advocate General Mischo).
109 Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.
110 H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 231,
233 (1995) (stating that the Magill doctrine “is only to be reckoned with” in cases “where the creator of factual information is also
the only source of that information (and such information happens to be protected under national copyright law),” and citing
databases as one example).
111 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039.
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no separate market for the brick structure and derived its primary benefit from excluding others from
using this system to organize pharmaceutical sales data. To impinge on its exercise of those rights in
a horizontal context would be to eviscerate them completely, for there can be no more fundamental
exercise of rights in telephone listings than in the telephone listing markets itself. Therefore, access to
primary markets, even where it concerns an essential facility, is allowed only in the most stringent
cases, where the essential facility cannot be duplicated by any entity. 112 Even so, the compensation
paid must adequately reflect that risk involved in the investment. 113
In contrast to the deferential approach taken in primary markets, courts will rule more heavily in
preventing downstream abuse. This approach has been justified on the grounds that the return and
incentives from control over exclusive exploitation in secondary markets is sharply distinct from
exploitation in the primary market. 114 In exploiting its database rights in the primary market, the
owner has already been rewarded according to any fair expectations it might have under the database
legislation. Therefore, where the dominant undertaking acted in a secondary downstream market to
reinforce its dominance in the primary market, it is still abusive, even if it occurred in the secondary
market. 115 This safeguard ensuring access for derivative markets is particularly important in the case
of databases. In the absence of any equivalent to the idea-expression doctrine offered under the
Directive, investors in effect obtain proprietary rights in data through the exclusive database right.
Many databases are specialized single source databases, with few or no viable alternative sources to
that information. It is therefore important that equitable access be granted to competitors and
consumers where the exercise of the right threat prejudices the greater public interest in
technological development and economic efficiency. Even then, as Magill shows, regulators will still
consider the ease of obtaining a substitute and examine whether the database owner is preventing the
appearance of a new product for which there is a real potential consumer demand.
It has been recently said that rivals seeking access to duplicate the owner’s database as in IMS
Health should be allowed to do so. 116 The argument goes that since providing a substitute is not
feasible given the fact that the database has become a de facto standard, access should be given in the
interests of fostering competition for its own sake. This will ensure that even if dynamic efficiency is
not fostered through innovation, at least allocative efficiency will be achieved through price
competition. Such notions reveal a lack of understanding of the subtleties of the interface between
the two regimes, and should be decisively rejected. Making inroads into the primary market
potentially voids the basis of intellectual property protection. Courts in the United States and
European Union have both recognized the IP owner’s right to exploit its property to the full extent
of its relevant market, barring a clear showing that it is an essential facility. Of course, no case to date
has gone so far as to deem IP rights in themselves to be essential facilities. Indeed, to do so would
border on usurping the legislation’s role in changing the scope of IP law. Further, granting access
discounts the competition and business decision that occurred ex ante to forming the standard. On
the former, the incumbent may well have been the most efficient competitor that triumphed in a
As the Court in Oscar Bronner held:
[I]n order for refusal of access to amount to an abuse, it must be extremely difficult not merely for the undertaking
demanding access but for any other undertaking to compete. Thus, if the cost of duplicating the facility alone is the
barrier to entry, it must be such as to deter any prudent undertaking from entering the market. In that regard it seems to
me that it will be necessary to consider all the circumstances, including the extent to which the dominant undertaking,
having regard to the degree of amortisation of its investment and the cost of upkeep, must pass on investment or
maintenance costs in the prices charged on the related market . . . .
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, ¶ 66 (opinion of Advocate General
Jacobs).
113 Id. ¶ 64 (noting that, where “competition can be achieved only by requiring a dominant undertaking to supply the product
or service or allow access to the facility,” the undertaking “must be fully compensated by allowing it to allocate an appropriate
proportion of its investment costs to the supply and to make an appropriate return on its investment having regard to the level of
risk involved.”).
114 Westkamp, supra note 74.
115 Case C-62/86, AKZO v. Comm’n, 1993 E.C.R. II-389.
116 Josef Drexl, IMS Health and Trinko—Antitrust Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound Economics in Refusal to Deal Cases, 35
INTERN. REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 788 (2004).
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market structure that tends toward monopoly. To this, the rebuttal is that the incumbent may have
simply entered a “thin” market and prevailed simply by being the first comer, rather than winning by
skill or efficiency. Accordingly, competition policy still has a legitimate interest in ensuring that later
innovators can enter and provide consumers with a superior product. However, it is difficult to see
how superior a product can be, if it requires access to facilitate heavy duplication of the incumbent’s
technology. Further, the incumbent may well have decided not to invest in the first place had it
known that the returns on its investments would be eroded by the law granting compulsory access to
rivals, leaving consumers without the benefit of any product.
D. Limitations in Application of Antitrust law
¶47
¶48
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While it is tolerably clear that antitrust law has an important role in ensuring the “accessincentive” balance in the exploitation of database, it is equally important courts and regulators are
aware of its limitations.
Database rights are essentially rights conferred in recognition of labor and investment, rather
than creativity or innovation. The cost and resources required to construct a commercially viable
database severely limits the number of possible players, and a finding of dominance often makes
vulnerable to a conclusion that the defendant holds a de facto monopoly in downstream markets. 117
This may be evinced in Magill, where the court held that dominance was established because the
defendant not only owned relevant IP, but also enjoyed a de facto monopoly in the TV listings
market. 118 Similarly, the European Competition Commission alleged that the 1860-brick structure at
issue in IMS Health was an industrial standard, and therefore subject to application of the EFD. A
narrow definition of a product market will likely eliminate all possible substitutes, resulting in
databases being deemed as a “sole-source” or conferring a de facto monopoly. 119
The problem with this argument justifying intervention is that the relevant market is established
with regard to factual information the defendant owns, and the derivative market is the market where
this information is exploited. Dominance is effortlessly established, without regard for the availability
to the market effect of such a refusal. For example, a broadcaster may have a 10% market share in
TV programs, but by defining the relevant market with respect to its TV listings, it would have a
100% market share over an “essential facility.” 120 This shoddy analysis puts the cart before the horse
and should be decisively rejected. A related, but more complicated, problem is that the market where
database rights may be exploited has been legislatively determined through specific provisions evoked
in its grant. It is common for IP rights owners to exploit related markets, as commonly seen in movie
and video game industries, where blockbuster movies are made into video games and vice versa. 121 In
this sense, the relevant market for IP law may encompass several antitrust law markets. 122 An
example of where IPRs should not extend to derivative markets arises in situations like the Volvo
case, involving refusals to supply spare parts to independent repairers or decisions to stop producing
spare parts. 123 In these cases, a plaintiff seeks to extend its design rights to a derivative market of
automobile maintenance where it has not been granted exclusive rights. However, it is hard to see
how that same reasoning is applicable to Magill, where the defendant sought to extend its copyright
to the derivative market that was protected by copyright. Considering this fact apart from the other
See ANDERMAN, supra note 104, at 247.
Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann & Indep. Television Publ’ns Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743.
119 Id. ¶ 45 (“For IPO, the concept of “factual monopoly” appears to be an artificial construct whereby the Commission seeks
to justify the use of competition law in order to change the specific subject-matter of copyright.”).
120 See Westkamp, supra note 74, at 16 (“Dominance can effortlessly be established since here it is the third party who would
determine to which information access is required.”).
121 This argument was put forward by the defendant in the Magill case. Radio Telefis Eireann, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 at ¶ 35
(“[C]opyright owners ordinarily and naturally exercise their copyright in order to restrict competition with their own product by
other products made using their copyright material, even on a derived market.”) (emphasis added).
122 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1151 (D. Kan. 2000) (“In particular, the Court agrees that a
single patent may implicate multiple antitrust markets.”).
123 Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211.
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incriminating factors, there was no justification for antitrust law intervention based on the defendant
extending its monopoly power to an adjacent market unprotected by IPRs. The refusal to authorize
reproduction of works protected by copyright did not go beyond that of merely securing the
exclusive reproduction right, and yet was condemned as anticompetitive. 124
One commentator suggests that this can be explained thus: when an IP-protected product
reaches the status of an industrial standard, whether because of its legal monopoly or not, it falls within the
scope of Article 82. 125 This view finds support in Magill heard at first instance. The court held that
where there was consumer demand in an ancillary market, this went beyond the “essential function”
of copyright. The defendant’s refusal to authorize third parties to publish its weekly listings was not
justified by the specific needs of preserving copyright. Thus, all circumstances involving a refusal to
license others, even where there is no extraneous abusive conduct other than the refusal to license
will be relevant for a finding of anticompetitiveness.
The problem here is that mere exploitation of an industrial standard without regard for rivals has
never been itself viewed as abusive under European law. 126 A firm that has achieved a market
standard by virtue of its investment in R&D and IP protection is normally entitled to continue to
compete by exercising its exclusionary rights even in “aftermarkets.” To find a refusal to supply or
license abusive, something more must be shown by the competition authorities to allow the
imputation of an abusive motive to the IP owner’s conduct other than a refusal to supply or license
as such.
Ultimately, application of antitrust law to IP cases where owners have a prima facie right to
unilaterally refuse license is a complex matter. By encroaching on the lawful prerogatives conferred
by database legislation, antitrust law may ultimately undermine its in-built system of rewards, and
threaten investment and innovation. Database rights, like other IPRs, have internal regulatory
mechanism preventing abuse. These include limitations in scope, length, and subject matter of
exploitation, through defenses and exceptions. While there is nothing within the EFD or leveraging
that inherently derails innovation, overbroad application can lead to perverse results. For example,
the economic logic underlying claims that a dominant database owner can use its power in one
market to leverage into another and then charge monopoly prices has been cast into doubt. 127 The
reasonable conclusion is that it is ordinarily impossible to obtain “two monopolies for the price of
one,” but that in certain circumstances market imperfections may give a dominant owner an
incentive to transfer its power to another market. The logical problem with the leverage story is that
the upstream monopolist’s price was already computed on the premise that the downstream market
is competitive. Consumer demand is based on the price for the whole. 128
Further, as Magill shows, if one regards the idea of essentiality loosely enough, there seems little
reason to distinguish EFD analysis from that of conventional leveraging cases. Indeed, there is a
danger that courts may apply the EFD in a leveraging context without extensive consideration of the
extent to which the dominant firms hold a dominant position in the downstream market. If niche
markets are selected as relevant, many facilities will be found to be essential. 129 In part, this may
reflect a preference for many essential facilities, the defendant was less an innovator and more the
124 R. Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 1 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 60 (1993).
125 Steven D. Anderman, Address at Clasf Conference, Does the Microsoft Case Offer a New Paradigm for the “Exceptional
Circumstances Test” and Compulsory Copyright Licenses Under EC Competition Law? (Sept. 9, 2004).
126 Ronald Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298
(1992).
127 See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1993); Louis Kaplow, Extension of
Monopoly: Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 543-45 (1985).
128 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 20.2c (2003).
129 Advocate General Jacobs warned against a wide concept of essential facilities for reducing the incentive to the original
investment, to duplicating it and requiring regulation over the price to be paid for access. See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH
& Co. KG v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, ¶ 64. See also Guido Westkamp, supra note 74 at 21 (“It appears doubtful that the
essential facilities doctrine can be applied to information at all.”).
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lucky beneficiary of having entered a “thin” market first. The problem with this view is that it ignores
the fact that secondary market rivals may also be potential primary market rivals. After all, market
definition is more a legal construct than a reflection of bright line distinctions on a production chain.
Hence, U.S. courts have been reluctant to adopt this omnibus approach and have often downplayed
the use of EFD to the extent of denying its existence, except in the lower courts.130
This makes good sense. The EFD differs from leveraging in two important respects. First, the
source of the monopoly power is scrutinized much more carefully than a simple monopoly. Not only
do the courts ensure that there is some justification for keeping the monopoly intact, they must also
satisfy themselves that there is no reasonable way for competition to be accommodated without
access. As a counterbalance to the stricter first requirement, the courts appear to relax the second
requirement of abusive conduct. Leveraging appears to require some degree of exclusionary conduct
stemming from the monopoly power. A defendant may avoid liability by pleading the benefits of
vertical integration. In contrast, a defendant in EFD cases may incur liability simply based on refusals
to cooperate. This may take the form of charging license royalties that render effective access
impossible. 131 Some recognition of this approach was given in Oscar Bronner, where it was stressed
that the requirement should be imposed “only in cases in which the dominant undertaking has a
genuine stranglehold on the related market,” not where control of the essential facility merely gives
the undertaking a competitive advantage. 132 Second, the EFD departs from its leveraging cousin in
terms of remedies. Leveraging remedies begin with identifying the unwarranted advantage in the
secondary market to find the corollary remedy. The EFD presumes the remedy: reasonable and
nondiscriminatory access, without regard to the specific injury incurred by the complaining party in
the second market. This requires some form of judicial supervision over the terms of access, which
makes it administratively unattractive. 133 Many prominent scholars have argued that the EFD should
be abolished outright. Others who favor its continued existence nonetheless concede that it is
properly applied only in rare cases. 134
Whether or not the database owner is using its IPRs as an instrument to abuse its dominant
position can be a difficult question to determine. While the courts have often reiterated that it is the
abuse of dominance, rather than dominance itself, that is prohibited, this understates the difficulty
for an undertaking to determine how far it can exploit its IPRs in the aggressive markets they operate
in. The problem is that the database owner may not think of the market strategy in terms of antitrust
law and may have regarded exploitation in the secondary market as important currency to invest.
Arguments that stronger rights to promote investment in databases result in anticompetitive conduct
tread on dangerous ground. Promoting investment is not only the goal of database law; it is
important to competition as well. Discouraging investment, even investment by monopolists, may
not promote competition, and instead leaves society saddled with the problems of monopoly without
beneficial new products. This is not to say that database rights can never be anticompetitive.
However, the cost of errors in punishing investments promoting technological change is rather high.
Even ambiguity regarding the legal rules risks deterring effort in creating new databases. Regulators
should therefore be cautious about condemning the exploitation of database rights unless they are
confident that the conduct in question truly harms effective competition. If the database industry is
to accept regulation by antitrust law, then it must prove itself to be capable of more sophisticated
regulation.
130 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 399, 411 (2004) (“The Court's
conclusion would not change even if it considered to be established law the “essential facilities” doctrine crafted by some lower
courts . . . . [W]e have never recognized such a doctrine . . . and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here.”).
131 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 846 F.2d 1422, 1428 (1990).
132 Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, at ¶ 40.
133 Id. at ¶ 69 (finding that accepting Bronner’s contention would lead to intervention that “would not only be unworkable but
would also be anti-competitive in the longer term and indeed would scarcely be compatible with a free market economy”).
134 Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841. See also HOVENKAMP, supra
note 128, at ¶ 7.7 (“The so-called essential facilities doctrine is one of the most troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable of
bases for . . . liability. The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if it were jettisoned.”).
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It is worth noting that the Competition Commission of Singapore has recently released its
Guidelines on the Treatment of Intellectual Property Rights. 135 These Guidelines chart the manner in
which Singapore’s newly enacted competition law will be enforced. Without an existing body of case
law to guide copyright owners potentially affected by the competition regime, undertakings must
carefully scrutinize the wording to determine the boundaries of liability. A core observation is that
the Guidelines expressly state the Commission’s willingness to treat IPRs as “essential facilities” as
long as it can show that there are no “potential substitutes” and that the facility is “indispensable to
the exercise of the activity in question.” 136 As in the European Union, controversy will likely arise in
Singapore when applying the EFD to rights in databases. This is because those seeking to adjudicate
concepts such as “indispensability” and “potential substitutes” may find themselves facing
diametrically opposed positions based on sound and established economic theory. By expressly
recognizing its applicability to IPRs in general and copyright in particular, the Commission seems to
mirror the approach in the recent landmark cases. 137 It also marks a sharp divergence in earlier E.U.
cases, as well as the U.S. position on the essential facilities doctrine. In any case, the Guidelines
suggest that the EFD will therefore likely stand as a prominent feature on the Singapore landscape at
the interface between copyright and competition law. The issues that have plagued the courts in the
European Union and United States are likely to promise interesting times for Singapore as well.
CONCLUSION
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The legal issues raised with respect to the protection of factual compilations are not new, but the
speed and complexity of today’s business and legal environment make regulation a more daunting
task than ever. It is undeniable that if investment in databases is to be encouraged, there must be
assurance of sufficient legal protection. It is therefore tempting to respond by instituting an
excessively broad and powerful legal monopoly. However, the danger in this is that society trades a
chronic state of underprotection for overprotection.
Data structures are building blocks in the most important scientific and technological pursuits
today, and the high social costs resulting from abuse of database rights could adversely affect
development strategies. While one may concede that protecting the database industry from marketdestructive appropriations constitutes a socially desirable goal, it is equally important to achieve that
goal in a manner that preserves the balancing principles inherent in existing IP regimes, which
promote both competition and investments in new products and services. Society therefore has
reason to guard against database owners who abuse rights conferred by database legislation to deny
the public access to information or to prevent competitors from offering a new product derived
from information contained in the database.
Various endogenous means of regulation have been explored and contrasted with antitrust law,
and it seems that the latter offers an alternative better reflecting commercial expectations. There is
much to be said for shifting the pressure of ensuring access regulation from the stage of the grant of
database rights to that of its exercise. The assurance of stronger upfront rights to protect investment
would encourage the database entrepreneurship, while ensuring robust action against the errant few
who abuse their rights to prevent effective competition. Further, in defining the boundaries between
permitted and prohibited conduct, antitrust laws have developed a strong framework of rules to
regulating access to information contained in databases, while preserving the incentive to invest in a
rapidly growing database industry. However, regulators need to be aware of the limitations of
135 COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SINGAPORE, GUIDELINE ON THE TREATMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
2005, available at
http://www.ccs.gov.sg/NR/rdonlyres/A67B68FC-DB6F-415B-9DF15A97FC6855A9/6714/CCSGuidelineonIPR20051228websitefinal2.pdf (last visited Nov. 2006).
136 Id. ¶ 4.7.
137 See Comm’n v. Microsoft, Case T-201/04 (2004); Attheraces v. British Horseracing Bd., [2005] EWHC 3015. This will also
be discussed in an upcoming paper, tentatively entitled Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential Facilities Doctrine and
the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 2006 SERCI Annual Congress, 29-30 June 2006, in Singapore.
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applying antitrust law to a regime delicately tuned with preexisting endogenous checks, as well as the
effects of their application on innovation by those spurred on by the assurance of monopoly profits.
Legislators in the United States, Australia, and Singapore must soon decide the way forward in
database protection. If protection is given on a reciprocity basis, the pressure to conform will be
significant in order for local database makers to penetrate foreign markets. The modest aim of this
paper does not go to the extent of suggesting that antitrust law provides a panacea for the access ills
of database rights. Indeed, other voices have risen in academia suggesting developing alternative
approaches to internal regulation from a principled extension of the protection of computer
programs, trade secrets, and even contract law. 138 Rather, this paper simply suggests that antitrust law
provides a viable means of easing access concerns whatever form database protection takes.
Ultimately, these rights must promote national competitiveness in an increasingly uncertain global
economic landscape. In this regard, a model that incorporates competition policy considerations is an
essential first step to the maintenance of an industrial policy that is both sound and sustainable.
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See, e.g., Wei, supra note 41, at 350.
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